We introduce an abstract domain for information-flow analysis of software. The proposal combines variable dependency analysis with numerical abstractions, yielding to accuracy and efficiency improvements. We apply the full power of the proposal to the case of database query languages as well. Finally, we present an implementation of the analysis, called Sails, as an instance of a generic static analyzer. Keeping the modular construction of the analysis, the tool allows one to tune the granularity of heap analysis and to choose the numerical domain involved in the reduced product. This way the user can tune the information leakage analysis at different levels of precision and efficiency.
Introduction
Protecting the confidentiality is a relevant problem when sensitive information flows through computing systems or transmits over public networks. Standard protection mechanisms, such as encryption, access control, etc. can suitably be applied at source level, but they are unable to protect the confidentiality once the information is released from the source and is allowed to flow through the computing systems.
The starting point of secure information flow analysis in software applications is the classification of program variables into different security levels. In the simplest case, two levels are commonly used: public (or low, L) and secret (or high, H). The main purpose is to prevent the leakage of sensitive information when flowing (implicitly or explicitly) from a high variable h to a lower one l. An explicit flow from h to l occurs when the content of h directly affects (e.g., through an assignment operator) l. On the other hand, an implicit flow from h to l occurs when the content of l gets affected indirectly (e.g., through a boolean condition in an if statement) by h, as stated in [17] .
There is a widespread literature on methods and techniques for checking secure information flows in software. Generally, works on information flow fall into two categories: (i) dynamic, instrumentation based approaches (e.g., tainting), and (ii) static, language-based approaches (e.g., type systems). The dynamic approaches introduce significant run-time overhead [10, 33] . The static approaches typically require some changes to the language and the run-time environment as well as non-trivial type annotations [38] , making their adoption too expensive in practice.
Nevertheless, despite of these deep and extensive works, their practical applications have been relatively poor. Usually these approaches work on an adhoc programming language [4] , and they do not support mainstream languages. This means that one should completely rewrite a program in order to apply them to some existing code.
Recently a new generic static analyzer (Sample 5 ) based on the Abstract Interpretation theory has been developed and applied to many different contexts and analysis. Roughly, this analyzer splits and combines the abstraction of the heap and the approximation of other semantic information, e.g. string [12] , type [19] abstractions.
In this paper 6 , we introduce a language-based information-flow analysis of imperative and database query languages based on the Abstract Interpretation framework, by combining symbolic and numerical domains; we present the tool Sails (Static Analysis of Information Leakage with Sample); finally, we show experimental results applying Sails on security benchmark programs.
In particular,
1. we represent variables' dependences in the form of propositional formula ψ = x → y, where x, y are variables and value of y possibly depend on the value of x; in order to detect possible information leakage, we check the satisfiability of ψ when assigning each variable the truth value corresponding to its sensitivity level; 2. we define abstract semantics of (i) imperative and (ii) database query languages in the domain of propositional formulae, by considering an overapproximation of variables' dependences at each program point; 3. we enhance the accuracy of the technique by analysing programs over numerical abstract domains, using reduced product of the symbolic propositional formulae domain and numerical abstract domains; 4. finally, we show encouraging experimental results on a set of security benchmarks using the tool Sails which is implemented based on our proposal.
The overall analysis combines a symbolic variable dependency analysis, based on the propositional formulae domain [11] , and a variable value dependency analysis using numerical abstractions (e.g., intervals or polyhedra). Unlike other works, our proposal provides an information flow analysis without any major constraint on the target language, since it tracks information flows between variables and heap locations over programs written in mainstream object-oriented languages like Java and Scala.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dependency analysis through the propositional formulae domain. Section 3 combines the dependency analysis with numerical domains through a reduced product. An extension to the case of database query languages is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main issues we solved in order to plug this information flow analysis into Sample while developing Sails. Section 6 presents the experimental results when applying Sails to a complex case study and to the SecuriBench-micro suite. Finally, Section 7 presents the related work and Section 8 concludes.
Dependency Analysis
This section formalizes the dependency analysis and proves its soundness following the abstract interpretation framework.
The Language
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a simple imperative language where programs consist of labeled commands (similar to [26] ). The syntax is defined in Table 1 7 . Let in : C → L and fin : C → L be two functions. By in c and fin c we denote the initial and final label of command c ∈ C respectively. These two functions are formally defined in Table 2 and Table 3 .
Each command corresponds to one or more actions. The set of actions, denoted by A, consists of { skip, v := exp, b, ¬b, endif, done}. Let a : C → ℘(A) be a function that, given a command, returns the set of actions involved in it. The function a for various commands is defined in Table 4 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the variables appearing in a program are implicitly declared. We denote by V(P) the set of variables in program P and, similarly, by V(exp) and V(b) the variables contained in expression exp and condition b respectively. The definition of V is reported in Table 5 .
The Concrete Domain
An environment ρ ∈ E is a function ρ : V → N which assigns a value to each variable. A state σ ∈ Σ = (L × E) is a pair , ρ where the program label is the label of the action to be executed and the environment ρ defines the values of program variables at .
We denote by E exp σ and B b σ the evaluation of expression exp ∈ E and condition b ∈ B respectively on the state σ. The details can be found in Tables 6  and 7 respectively. 
Given a program P, the set of possible initial and final states are defined as I P ≡ in P , ρ | ρ ∈ E and F P ≡ fin P , ρ | ρ ∈ E .
The labeled transition semantics T c of a command c ∈ P is a set of transitions σ 1 , a, σ 2 between a state σ 1 and its next states σ 2 by an action a ∈ a(c). The triple σ 1 , a, σ 2 is also denoted by σ 1 Table 8 tracks all reachable states. A labeled transition system is a tuple Σ, I, F, A, T , where Σ is the set of states, I ⊆ Σ is a nonempty set of initial states, F ⊆ Σ is a set of final states, A is a nonempty set of actions, and T ∈ ℘(Σ × A × Σ) is the labeled transition relation.
We define the partial trace semantics of a transition system, similarly to [26] , as the set of all possible traces of elements in Σ (denoted by Σ ), recording the observation of executions starting from initial states and possibly reaching final states in finite time.
Let π 0 , π 1 ∈ Σ be two partial traces. We define the following lattice operators: Table 6 : Evaluation of expressions 
-π 0 π 1 if and only if π 0 is a subtrace of π 1 ,
Σ equipped with the order relation " " and the meet operator" ", forms the meet semi lattice Σ , , . This partial trace semantics can be expressed in a fixpoint form as well.
Let ℘(Σ ), ⊆, ∅, Σ , ∩, ∪ be a complete lattice of partial execution traces, where "⊆" is the classical subset relation, "∪" is the set union and "∩" the set intersection.
Abstract Domain: Pos
Among all the abstract domains which are used in abstract interpretation of logic programs, Pos has received considerable attention [2, 11] . This domain is most commonly applied to the analysis of groundness dependencies for logic programs. Let V = {x, y, z, · · · } be a countably infinite set of propositional variables and let FP(V) be the set of all finite subsets of variables of V. The set of propositional formulae containing variables in V and logical connectives in Γ ⊆ {∧, ∨, →, ¬} is denoted by Ω(Γ). Similarly, given U ∈ FP(V), the set of propositional formulae containing variables in U and connectives in Γ is denoted by Ω U (Γ). 
A truth-assignment is a function Υ : V → {T, F} that assigns to each propositional variable the value true (T) or false (F). Given a formula f ∈ Ω(Γ), Υ f means that Υ satisfies f, and f 1 f 2 is a shorthand for "Υ f 1 implies Υ f 2 ". Ω(Γ) is ordered by f 1 f 2 ⇔ f 1 f 2 . Two formulae f 1 and f 2 are logically equivalent, denoted f 1 ≡ f 2 iff f 1 f 2 and f 2 f 1 .
The unit assignment u is defined by u(x) = T for all x ∈ V. We define the set of positive formulae by Pos = {f ∈ Ω(Γ) | u f}. Some obvious examples are T, x 1 ∈ Pos and F, ¬x 1 Pos.
We can consider the propositional formula ψ as a conjunction of subformulae (ζ 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ζ n ). We denote the set of subformulae of ψ as Sub ψ . Let be the least upper bound operator on propositional formula defined by {ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n } = {Sub ψ 0 , . . . , Sub ψ n }. (Pos, , ) forms a join semi lattice. Moreover, let : Pos × Pos → Pos be a binary operator defined as "simplification" between two propositional formulae: ψ 0 ψ 1 = (Sub ψ 0 \ Sub ψ 1 ). This "simplification" permits us to obtain all the implication in ψ 0 which are not contained in ψ 1 .
Abstract Semantics
Our approach is based on the abstract domain of logic formulae representing dependency between variables (which tracks the propagation of sensitive/insensitive information). The detection of possible information leakages is performed by evaluating formulae on truth-assignment functions. In particular, the analysis involves the following steps:
-Constructs at each program point the propositional formula ψ through a fixpoint algorithm which represents an over-approximation of variable's dependencies up to that program point. Formally, an abstract state σ ∈ Σ def = L × Pos is a pair , φ where φ ∈ Pos represents the dependencies occurred among program variables up to label ∈ L. Given a pair σ = , φ , we define l(σ ) = and r(σ ) = φ. Let BV(c), defined in Table 9 , be the set of bound variables in command c.
The abstract semantics of a command c is defined by T c . Similar to the concrete domain, we denote the transition from σ 1 to σ 2 by σ 1 → σ 2 . The abstract semantics in the domain of propositional formulae is defined in Table 10 .
Consider two sets of abstract states S 1 and S 2 such that
forms a poset since it is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive by basic properties of logic implication. The join operator is defined by:
and the meet operator by: 
Basically, the join operator consists in the union of all elements. When two elements have the same label but different formula, the join operator takes the biggest one. Instead, the meet operator considers only the abstract states, with the same label, which are in all elements. In case of different formulae, the meet operator takes the smallest one. By definition join and meet operator are defined for every subset of elements of our domain. Therefore, we can conclude that ℘(Σ ), , ∅, Σ , , forms a complete lattice. Let I P = { in P , T } be the set of possible initial abstract state of program P. We define the abstract semantics as the set of all finite sets of abstract states, denoted by Σ , reachable during one or more executions, in a finite time. For each element S ∈ Σ we can denote by S the set of terminal states, defined as S = {σ 0 | σ 1 ∈ S.σ 0 → σ 1 ∈ T} and by (S) all labels of S. Let S σ 0 ,σ n denote a set of states, called abstract sequence, that contains a starting state σ 0 and an ending state σ n such that contains one or more traces from σ 0 to σ n . We have that
We express the abstract semantics in a fixpoint form. 
Example 1. In order to better understand how our dependency analysis works, consider the code in Figure 1 and the program points 4, 5, 8, 10, 12 and 14. When we apply the steps defined above we obtain the propositional formulae in Table 11 .
Through our analysis we tracked all the relation between variables. Suppose that variables {x, p} are private, while all other variables are public. Formally, the correspondent truth-assignment function is defined by Υ = {x, p → T} ∪ {v → F : v ∈ V\{x, p}}. Υ does not satisfy the propositional formulae since in all considered program points there are some public variables that depends on one or more private variables. Notice that we detect several spurious relations, too. For instance, in contrast with the obtained result, the variable sum does not depend on n. Indeed at the end of the both branches the variable sum has always the same value. In Section 3 we will refine the results through the domains combination.
An Instrumented Concrete Domain
To simplify the proof that our concrete and abstract domains from a Galois connection, we introduce another domain, isomorphic to the concrete domain. Let σ ∈ Σ = L × A be the set of states of this intermediate domain. A pair , a ∈ L × A represents an action a which occurs at program label . Consider the set Σ which contains all the possible traces of σ that can occur during a finite computation. Given Π 0 , Π 1 ∈ ℘(Σ ), we define that Π 0 ⊆ Π 1 if and only if for each π 0 ∈ Π 0 there exists a π 1 ∈ Π 1 such that π 0 π 1 . We have that π 0 π 1 if and only if π 0 is a subsequence of π 1 . Therefore ℘(Σ ), ⊆, ∅, Σ , ∩, ∪ forms a lattice. Moreover, we denote by π the last state of the sequence. We can relate ℘(Σ ) and
Let X = {π 0 , . . . , π n } ∈ ℘(Σ ) be a set of partial traces and let Y = {π 0 , . . . , π n } ∈ ℘(Σ ) be a set of sequences of σ .
(where id is the identity function).
Proof. We have to prove that γ • α = α • γ = id, where id is the identity function. Let X and Y be elements of ℘(Σ ) and ℘(Σ ) respectively.
Now we define the relation between ℘(Σ ) and ℘(Σ ) by α and γ . α :
π which represents a while statement and
Intuitively, the function θ transforms each action (or sequence of actions) in one or more propositional formulae. The easiest (case 1) applies when the action is an assignment statement (v := exp): we simply obtain the corresponding formula as defined in the transition semantics T. Instead, for if statements (case 2), we track all the assignment actions that are between if and endif. while statements are treated in a similar way (case 3).
Informally, the pair if and endif (or while and done) is an if (while) statement if and only if between these two actions, there are only assignments or other pairs if-endif or while-done which correspond to nested if and while statements. To better understand, consider the sequence
, endif · · · : the pairs 0 , b 0 and 3 , endif are not an if statement because between these two actions there is 1 , b 1 , which does not represent an assignment action neither an if statement.
The concretization function γ :
for all π 0 ∈ X 0 and π 1 ∈ X 1 . Then we have α (X 0 ) α (X 1 ): α (X 1 ) contains all the elements in α (X 0 ).
}. By definition of " " and by Lemma 2, for all π 0 ∈ γ (X 0 ) exists π 1 ∈ γ (X 1 ). Therefore γ (X 0 ) γ (X 1 ).
contains the least upper bound of all the abstract traces that have the same last label of X and that are less or equal than X. Therefore α (γ (X)) = X.
By definition of " ", " " and by Lemma 2, X γ (α (X)).
Proof. ℘(Σ ) and ℘(Σ ) are two complete lattices, γ and α are monotonic (Lemma 3 and 4), α • γ is the identity (Lemma 5) and γ • α is extensive (Lemma
Finally, we can express the relation between ℘(Σ ) and ℘(Σ ) by the composition of above functions, α = α • α and γ = γ • γ . Since the composition of an isomorphism and a Galois insertion is a Galois insertion, we can assert that
Properties
The aim of information flow analysis is to verify the confidentiality and the integrity of the information in computer programs. An information flow analysis can be carried out by considering different attacker abilities. In this context we consider two different scenarios: when the attacker can read public variables only at the beginning and at the end of the computation, and when the attacker can read public variables after each step of the computation. Note that the attacker, in both cases, knows the source code of the program. Both the properties and the types of attacker are checked through the definition and the satisfiability of the propositional formulae (Pos) with respect to the truth-assignment function. Let Υ P : V → {T, F} be a truth-assignment function associated with the program P. The security properties are modeled by the function definition, while the attacker is modeled by the set of propositional formulae we consider for the satisfiability. For the first case, in which the attacker can read public variables only at the beginning and at the end of the computation, the set of states to consider involves only the terminal states of each sequence ({S ∈ Σ | Υ P r(S )}). Whereas in the second case, when the attacker can read public variables at each step of the computation, the set of states to consider involves all the propositional formulae in the sequence ({S ∈ Σ | ∀σ ∈ S : Υ P r(σ )}).
Confidentiality Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to authorized users. For example, we require when we buy something online that our private data(e.g., credit card number) can be read only by the merchant.
Let Υ P : V → {L, H} be a function which assigns to each variable of program P a security class. P respects the confidentiality property, if and only if it does not contain any information leakage with respect to the function Υ P , i.e., there is no information that moves from private to public variables. To verify this property, we define the corresponding truth-assignment function Υ P as follows.
Integrity By integrity we mean that unauthorized people cannot modify a message. Let Υ P : V → {L, H} be a function which assigns to each variable of program P a security class. The integrity property is verified if and only if public variables do not modify private variables, i.e., there is no information leakage from public variables to private variables. The corresponding truth-assignment function Υ P , to check this property, is defined as follows.
Notice that it is exactly the opposite of the truth-assignment function for the confidentiality property.
Combination of Symbolic and Numerical Domains
In this Section, we combine the symbolic propositional formulae domain described above with a numerical domain through reduced product, yielding to a refinement of the results obtained by the dependency analysis. Our modular construction allows to tune efficiency and accuracy changing the numerical domain. For instance, if we use intervals, we will be less precise than by using polyhedra, but we will obtain a more efficient analysis. Let us briefly recall the main features of some numerical domains already in the literature. Polyhedra Convex polyhedra are regions of some n-dimensional space that are bounded by a finite set of hyperplanes. A convex polyhedron in R n describes a relation between n quantities. P. Cousot and N. Halbwachs [15] applied the theory of abstract interpretation to the static determination of linear equalities and inequalities among program variables by introducing the use of convex polyhedra as an abstract domain.
We denote by v = (v 0 , . . . v n−1 ) ∈ R n a n-tuple (vector) of real numbers; v · w denotes the scalar product of vectors v, w ∈ R n ; the vector 0 ∈ R has all components equal to zero. Let x be a n-tuple of distinct variables. Then β = (a · x b) denotes a linear constraint, for each vector a ∈ R n , where a 0, b ∈ R and = {=, ≥, >}. A linear inequality constraint β defines an affine half-space of R n , denoted by con({β}). A set P ∈ R n is a (convex) polyhedron if and only if P can be expressed as the intersection of a finite number of affine half-spaces of R n , i.e., as the solution of a finite set of linear inequality constraints. The set of all polyhedra on the vector space R n is denoted as P n . Let P n , ⊆, ∅, R n , , ∩ be a lattice of convex polyhedra, where "⊆" is the set-inclusion, the empty set and R n as the bottom and top elements, respectively. The binary meet operation returns the greatest polyhedron smaller than or equal to the two arguments, correspond to set intersection, and " " is the binary join operation and returns the least polyhedron greater than or equal to the two arguments. This abstract domain has exponential complexity, and it does not scale up in practice.
For more details about polyhedra, many works in literature define abstract domains based on polyhedra as Galois connection [6] and implement this domain [5, 27] .
Octagons A. Miné introduced Octagons [35] for static analysis by abstract interpretation. The author extended a former numerical domain based on Difference-Bound Matrices [34] and showed practical algorithms to represent and manipulate invariants of the form ±x ± y ≤ c (where x and y are program variables and c is a real constant) efficiently. Such invariants describe sets of point that are special kind of polyhedra called octagons because they feature at most eight edges in a two dimensional space.
The set of invariants which the analysis discovers is a subset of the ones discovered by Polyhedra, but it is quite efficient. In fact, it infers the invariants with a O(n 2 ) worst case memory complexity per abstract state and a O(n 3 ) worst case time complexity per abstract operation, where n is the number of variables in the program.
The Reduced Product
The best way to combine the propositional formulae domain ℘(Σ ), , ∅, Σ , , and a numerical domain ℵ, ℵ , ⊥ ℵ , ℵ , ℵ , ℵ is by using the reduced product operator [14] .
Let ℘(Σ ) −−−→ ←−−− be a set of partial traces, and N ∈ ℵ an element of the numerical domain (a set of intervals, an octagon or a polyhedron). Notice that whatever domain you choose, N can be seen as a set of relations among variables value. The reduce operator is defined as ( X, N ) = X , N where
The reduced operator is aimed at excluding pointless dependencies for all variables which have the same value during the execution, without loosing purposeful relations (by the condition "x z"). The reduce operator removes from the propositional formulae, contained in X, the implications which have at the right side a variable that has a constant value. In fact if the variable has a constant value, it cannot depend on other variables. Then, the reduced product D is defined as follows:
We define the least upper bound and greatest lower bound operator by X 0 , N 0
forms a complete lattice. In order to better understand the improvements yielded by the combination of the two domains consider the following example.
foo ( ) { 0 n = 0 ; 1 x = 1 ; 2 i = 0 ; 3 y = x −1; 4 sum = p ; while ( 5 i<= k ) do i f ( 6 n%2 == 0 ) then 7 sum = y + p ; 8 n = n +1; e l s e 9 sum = x +(p − 1 ) ; 10 n = n +3; 11 e n d i f 12 i = i +1; 13 done } 
When we apply the reduce operator defined above we obtain the following propositional formulas:
By using the reduce operator we simplified the propositional formulas, removing some implications which could in fact generate false alarms when using the direct product of the domains instead of the reduced product. For instance, in Pos analysis we track the relation y → sum. At the same time, in the numerical analysis, we detect that variable sum is always equal to p (namely it is constant). This means that y → sum is a false alarm, hence by the reduce product we may delete it. At the same time, we cannot remove the relation between sum and p because it is detected also by the numerical analysis.
An Extension to Database Query Languages
In this section, we extend the full power of the proposed model to the case of dataintensive applications embedding SQL statements, in order to identify possible leakage of sensitive database information as well. This is particular important as in fact unauthorized leakage often occurs while propagating through database applications accessing and processing them legitimately.
A Motivating Example
Consider the database of Table 12 where customer's personal information and journey-details are stored in tables "Customer" and "Travel" respectively. On booking a particular flight by a customer, the journey details are added to the table "Travel" and the source-destination distance is added to the corresponding entry in 'DistanceCovered' attribute of the table "Customer". Observe that 10 points on the journey each 100 km are offered which is reflected in the attribute 'Points'. In addition, a boarding-priority value in the attribute 'BoardPriority' is assigned to each journey based on the points acquired by the passenger. This is depicted by procedure BookFlight() in program P in Figure 2 .
Assume that values of the attributes 'Address', 'Age', 'DistanceCovered' and 'Points' in table "Customer" are private, whereas the information in Table  " Travel" is public. To distinguish from the database attributes, we prefix $ to the application variables in P. Finally, suppose the company has decided to upgrade the customers having more than 50 'Points' to the status of 'BoardPriority'. This is expressed in P by the activation of the Upgrade() function. It is clear from the code that the values of 'BoardPriority' in tuples where 'custID' are equal to '1' and '3' will be upgraded from 2 to 3 and from 3 and 7 respectively. Therefore, an attacker can easily deduce the exact values of sensitive attribute 'Points' in Table " Customer", by observing the change that occurred in the public attribute 'BoardPriority' in Table " Travel".
The example above clearly shows that sensitive database information may be leaked through database applications when public attribute values depend, directly or indirectly, on private attribute values or private application variable values in the program. For instance, in the given example, the leakage occurs due to the dependence "Points→ BoardPriority" at program label 19. 
Labeled Syntax and Concrete Semantics
The labeled syntax description of the language, depicted in Table 13 , includes imperative statements embedding SQL. We express an SQL statement by a tuple OP, φ , where φ is a precondition following first-order logic which is used to identify a set of tuples in the database on which the appropriate operation OP (either select, or insert, or update, or delete) is performed. Each operation represents a set of actions, e.g. select operation includes GROUP BY, aggregate functions, ORDER BY, etc. Observe that applications embedding SQL statements involve two distinct sets of variables: application variables V a and database variables V d . Variables from V d appear only in the SQL statements, whereas variables in V a may appear in all types of instructions (either SQL or imperative).
We define the action function a and variable function V for the language in Tables 14 and 15 respectively. Lets recall from [23] the notion of environments correspond to the variables in V a and V d respectively.
An application environment ρ a ∈ E a maps a variable x ∈ dom(ρ a ) ⊆ V a to its value ρ a (x). So, E a V a −→ D where D is the semantic domain for V a .
Consider a database as a set of indexed tables {t i | i ∈ I x } for a given set of indexes I x . A database environment is defined by a function ρ d whose domain is I x , such that for i ∈ I x , ρ d (i) = t i . 
Set of Database Attributes
where ⊕ ∈ {+, −, * , /} b ∈ B Set of Boolean Expressions
where ∈ {≤, ≥, ==, >, , . . . } and ⊗ ∈ {∨, ∧} SQL Preconditions τ ∈ T Set of Terms
where f n is an n-ary function.
Set of Atomic Formulas
where R n (τ 1 , τ 2 , ..., τ n ) ∈ {true, false} φ ∈ W Set of Pre-conditions 
Given a database environment ρ d and a table t ∈ d. Assume attr(t)
where a i is the attribute corresponding to the typed domain D i . A table environment ρ t for a table t is defined as a function such that for any attribute a i ∈ attr(t), ρ t (a i ) = π i (l j ) | l j ∈ t , where π is the projection operator and π i (l j ) represents i th element of the l j -th row. In other words, ρ t maps a i to the ordered set of values over the rows of the table t.
A state σ ∈ Σ L × E d × E a is denoted by a tuple , ρ d , ρ a where ∈ L, ρ d ∈ E d and ρ a ∈ E a are the label of the statement to be executed, the database environment and the application environment respectively.
The set of states of a program P is, thus, defined as
where L[[P]] is the set of labels in P, and E d [[P]] and E a [[P]
] are the sets of database and application environments whose domain is the set of database and application variables in P only.
The labeled transition relation T : Σ × A −→ ℘(Σ) specifies which successor states σ = , ρ d , ρ a ∈ Σ can follow when an action a ∈ A executes on state σ = , ρ d , ρ a ∈ Σ. We denote a labeled transition by σ 
T[[P]]σ
The labeled transition semantics of various commands in database applications can easily be defined from the semantic description reported in [23] .
Given a program P, let I = in P , ρ d , ρ a | ρ a ∈ E a ∧ ρ d ∈ E d } be the set of initial states of P. The partial trace semantics of P can be defined as
where 
, where f n is an n-ary function.
Abstract Semantics
In case of applications embedding SQL statements, we need to consider two additional dependences, called database-database dependence and program-database dependence [24] . Table 13 that the syntax of SELECT statement is defined as:
According the syntax defined above, q 1 can be formulated as: From q 1 we get the following set of logical formula representing variable dependences:
Below we depict variable dependences in other SQL commands. The logical formula obtained from q 4 are:
The dependences above indicate explicit-flow of information. An example of implicit-flow that may occur in case of our application is, for instance, when manipulation of any public database information is performed under the control statements involving high variables. Table 16 depicts abstract labeled transition semantics of various statements in database applications. The abstract semantics of the program is obtained by fix-point computation over the abstract domain. 
Enhancing the analysis
The dependences that we considered so far are syntax-based, and may yield false positives in the analysis. For instance, let us consider the database in Table  17 and the query q 5 . The following logical formulae representing PD-dependences exist in q 5 :
Assuming 'Sal', 'BASIC', 'HRA', 'DA' are private and at least one employee in each job-type must exist, we see that although syntactic PD-dependences above indicating the presence of information leakage, but in practice nothing about these secrets is leaked through v a .w 1 .
Here is an another example of PD-dependence that is indicating false alarm on leakage: consider the code {$x = 4 * $w * log 2; UPDATE t SET a = a+ $x; }. Assuming $x is private and $w, a are public, we see that the dependence $x → a generates false alarm as because $x is always equal to 0.
To remove all such false alarms and to increase the accuracy of the analysis, we analyze programs by using the semantic-based abstract interpretation framework.
Consider an abstract domain ℵ where numerical attributes and numerical application variables are abstracted by the domain of intervals 8 . The abstraction yields an abstract query q 6 corresponding to q 6 and an abstract database depicted in Table 18 . The right-hand side expression of the condition in WHERE is evaluated to abstract values [936, 1480] , [1638, 2000] , and [2255, 2542] respectively corresponding to the three abstract tuples in "Job ". Observe that, according to the assumption that at least one employee must exist in each job-type, there exist at least one 'Sal ' in "Emp " for which "Sal = [936, 1480]" is true, according to the following:
Similar for "Sal = [1638, 2000]" and "Sal = [2255, 2542]". Therefore, the evaluation of q 6 on dB always gives the same result w.r.t. the property ℵ, irrespective of the states of "Emp".
We can perform similar analysis of the code {$x = 4 * $w * log 2; UPDATE t SET a = a + $x;} in the domain of intervals, yielding to "no update" of the values in public attribute a.
The interaction of the logical and numerical domains can be formalized by using the reduced Product D as follows:
In the example above, by analyzing q 6 in the abstract domain ℵ where numerical variables are abstracted by the domain of intervals, we see that the value of v a .w 1 generated by q 6 is always constant throughout the program execution w.r.t. ℵ. As ψ 6 ∈ Pos and v a .w 1 ∈ ℵ, the reduced product operator removes from ψ 6 all dependences in the form "x → v a .w 1 " (that are representing false alarms), and makes the analysis more accurate and efficient.
Implementing the Analysis in Sails
In this section, we present Sails . The tool is an instance of the generic analyzer Sample . This is why we discuss the main issues we have to solve in order to deal with information leakage analysis within Sample.
Sample
Sample (Static Analyzer of Multiple Programming LanguagEs) is a generic analyzer based on the abstract interpretation theory. Relying on compositional analyses, Sample can be plugged with different heap abstractions, approximations of other semantic information (e.g., numeric domains or information flow), properties of interest, and languages. Several heap analyses, semantic and numerical domains have been already plugged. The analyzer works on an intermediate language called Simple. Up to now, Sample supports the compilation of Scala and Java bytecode to Simple. Figure 3 depicts the overall structure of Sample. Source code programs are compiled to Simple. A fixpoint engine receives a heap analysis, a semantic domain, and a control flow graph (whose blocks are composed by a sequence of Simple statements), and it produces an abstract result over the control flow graph of each method. This result is passed to a property checker that produces some output (e.g., warnings) to the user. The integration of an analysis in Sample allows one to take advantage of all aspects not strictly related to the analysis but that can improve its final precision (e.g., heap or numerical abstractions). For instance, Sample is interfaced with the Apron library [28] and contains a heap analysis based of TVLA [39] .
Heap Abstraction
In Sample heap locations are approximated by abstract heap identifiers. While the identifiers of program variables are fixed and represent exactly one concrete variable, the abstract heap identifiers may represent several concrete heap Fig. 3 : The structure of Sample locations (e.g., if they summarize a potentially unbounded list), and they can be merged and split during the analysis. In particular we have to support (i) assignments on summary heap identifiers, and (ii) renaming of identifiers.
In order to preserve the soundness of Sails, we have to perform weak assignments on summary heap identifiers. Since a summary abstract identifier may represent several concrete heap locations and only one of them would be assigned in one particular execution, we have to take the upper bound between the assigned value, and the old one.
The heap abstraction could require to rename, summarize or split existing identifiers. This information is passed through a replacement function rep : ℘(Id) → ℘(Id), where Id is the set containing all heap identifiers. For instance, in TVLA two abstract nodes represented by identifiers a 1 and a 2 may be merged to a summary node a 3 , or a summary abstract node b 1 may be splitted to b 2 and b 3 . Our heap analysis will pass {a 1 , a 2 } → {a 3 } and {b 1 } → {b 2 , b 3 } to Sails in these cases, respectively. Given a single replacement S 1 → S 2 , Sails removes all subformulae dealing with some of the variables in S 1 , and for each removed subformula s it inserts a new subformula s renaming each of the variables in S 1 to each of the variables in S 2 . Formally:
Propositional Formulae
We have to introduce some slight modifications on the domain for information leakage analysis described in Section 2 to work with object oriented languages. We can consider a propositional formula φ as a conjunction of subformulae (ζ 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ζ n ). In the implementation, each subformula is an implication between two identifiers. Then we represent a subformula as a pair of identifiers and a formula as a set of subformulae. Consider the statement if(x > 0) y = z;. The formula obtained after the analysis of this statement is represented by the set {(y, z), (x, y)}, where we denote the identifier of the variable u byū. The order relation " " is defined by the subset relation (φ 0 φ 1 ⇔ φ 0 ⊆ φ 1 ). Consequently, in the implementation the set of propositional variables V consists in the set of identifier Id, a single propositional formula is represented by ℘(Id × Id) and an abstract state σ ∈ Σ is a conjunction of propositional formulae represented by ℘(℘(Id × Id)).
Implicit Flow Detection
An implicit information flow occurs when there is an information leakage from a variable in a condition to a variable assigned inside a block dependent on that condition. For instance, in if(x > 0) y = z; there is an explicit flow from z to y, and an implicit flow from x to y. To record these relations we relate the variables in the conditions to the variables that have been assigned in the block. When we join two blocks coming from the same condition, we discharge all implicit flows on the abstract state. Observe that Sails does not support all cfgs that can be represented in Sample but only the ones coming from structured programs, i.e., that corresponds to programs with if and while statements and not with arbitrary jumps like goto.
Property
An information flow analysis can be carried out by considering different attacker abilities. We implemented two scenarios: when the attacker can read public variables only at the beginning and at the end of the computation, and when the attacker can read public variables after each step of the computation 9 .
Moreover, we implemented two security properties for each attacker: secrecy (i.e., information leakage analysis) and integrity. The verification of these properties happens after the computation of the analysis and the declaration of private variables (at run time, by a text files writing the variables name or by a graphical user interface selecting the variables in a list).
Numerical Analysis
The information flow analysis is based on the reduced product of a dependency and a numerical analysis. Thanks to the compositional structure of Sample, we can plug Sails with different numerical domains. In particular, Sample supports the Apron library. In this way, we can combine Sails with all numerical domains contained in Apron (namely, Polka, the Parma Polyhedra Library, Octagons, and a deep implementation of Intervals).
In addition, we can apply different heap abstractions. For instance, if we are not interested to the heap structure, we can use a less accurate domain that approximates all heap locations with one unique summary node, as we will do in Section 6.2.
Complexity of the Analysis
The complexity of variables dependency analysis showed in Section 2 is strictly correlated to the complexity of propositional formulae. Logical domains, in literature, are widely treated and generally, the logical equivalence of two boolean expression is a co-NP-complete problem. However, this complexity issue may not matter much in practice because the size of the set of variables appearing in the program is reasonably small. Hence, on the one hand, work with propositional formulae requires the solving of a co-NP-complete problem, while on the other hand, in many frameworks (included our system), Pos only deal with the variables appearing in the programs, reducing in this way the complexity. Generally, it is possible to increase the efficiency of the computation using the binary decision diagrams (BDDs) for the implementation of propositional formulae. For more information about binary decision diagrams see [1] .
The simplification adopted in the implementation, i.e. the definition of " " by the subset relation (φ 0 φ 1 ⇔ φ 0 ⊆ φ 1 ), permits to decrease the complexity. In fact, decreasing the precision of the analysis, we can compare two propositional formulae in polynomial time.
About polyhedra analysis, the complexity is well and completely treated in many works [5] and heavily depends on its implementation. For example many implementations, e.g. Polylib and New Polka, use matrices of coefficients, that cannot grow dynamically, and the worst case space complexity of the methods employed is exponential. In PPL library, instead, all data structures are fully dynamic and automatically expanded (in amortized constant time) ensuring the best use of available memory. Comparing the efficiency of polyhedra libraries is not a simple task, because the pay-off depends on the targeted applications: in [5] the authors presented many test results about it.
The complexity of reduced product, and more precisely of reduction operator presented in Section 3.1, is strictly connected with the complexity of the operations on the domains we combine.
Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of Sails. First of all, we present the results in terms of precision when we analyze a case study involving recursive data structures. Then, we present the results obtained when applying Sails to the SecuriBench-micro suite.
Case Study
Consider the Java code in Figure 4 . Class ListWorkers models a list of workers of an enterprise. Each node contains the salary earned by the worker, and some other data (e.g., name and surname of the person). Method updateSalaries is defined as well. It receives a list of employees and a list of managers. These two lists are supposed to be disjoint. First method updateSalaries computes the maximal salary of an employee. Then it traverses the list of managers updating their salary to the maximal salary of employees if manager's salary is less than that.
Usually managers would not like to leak information about their salary to employees (secrecy property). This property could be expressed in Sails specifying that we do not want to have a flow of information from managers to employees. More precisely, we want to prove the absence of information leakage from the content of field salary of any node reachable from managers to any node reachable from employees.
We combine Sails with a heap analysis that approximates all objects created by a program point with a single abstract node [20] . We start the analysis of method updateSalaries with an abstract heap in which lists managers and employees are abstracted with a summary node and they are disjoint. Figure 5 depicts the initial state, where n2 and n4 contains the salary values of the ListWorkers n1 and n3, respectively. In the graphic representation we adopt dotted circles to represent summary nodes, rectangles to represent local variables, and edges between nodes to represent what is pointed by local variables or fields of objects. Note that the structure of these two lists does not change during the analysis of the program, since method updateSalaries does not modify the heap structure.
Sails infers that, after the first while loop at line 15, there is a flow of information from n2 to maxSalary. This happens because variable it points to n1 before the loop (because of the assignment at line 9), and it iterates following field next (obtaining always the summary node n1) perhaps assigning the content of it.salary (that is, node n2) to maxSalary. Therefore, at line 15 we have the propositional formula n2 → maxSalary.
Then updateSalaries traverses the managers list. For each node, it could assign maxSalary to it.salary. Similarly to what happened in the previous loop, c l a s s ListWorkers { i n t s a l a r y ; ListWorkers next ; . . . } p u b l i c void u p d a t e S a l a r i e s ( ListWorkers employees , ListWorkers managers ) { i n t maxSalary = 0 ; ListWorkers i t =employees ; while ( i t != n u l l ) { i f ( i t . s a l a r y >maxSalary ) maxSalary= i t . s a l a r y ; i t = i t . next ; } i t =managers ; while ( i t != n u l l ) { i f ( i t . s a l a r y < maxSalary ) i t . s a l a r y=maxSalary ; i t = i t . next ; } } Fig. 4 : A motivating example variable it points to n3 before and inside the loop, since field next always points to the summary node n3. Therefore the assignment at line 18 could potentially affects only node n4. For this reason, Sails discovers a flow of information from maxSalary to n4, represented by the propositional formula maxSalary → n4.
At the end of the analysis, Sails soundly computes that (n2 → maxSalary) ∧ (maxSalary → n4). By the transitive property, we know that there could be a flow of information from n2 to n4, that is, from employees to managers. This flow is allowed by our security policy. On the other hand, we also discovered that there is no information leakage from list managers to list employees, since Sails does not contain any propositional formula with this flow. Therefore Sails proves that this program is safe.
"Noninterference of programs essentially means that a variable of confidential (high) input does not cause a variation of public (low) output" [38] . Thanks to the combination between a heap abstraction and an abstract domain tracking information flow, Sails deals directly with the structure of the heap, extending the concept of noninterference from variables to portions of the heap represented by abstract nodes. This opens a new scenario since we can prove that a whole data structure does not interfere with another one, as we have done in this example. As far as we know, Sails is the only tool that performs a noninterference analysis over a heap abstraction, and therefore it can prove properties like "there is no 
Benchmarks
A well-established way of studying the precision and the efficiency of information flow analyses is the SecuriBench-micro suite [45] . We applied Sails to this test suite; the description and the results of these benchmarks are reported in Table 19 . Column fa reports if the analysis did not produce any false alarm. We combined Sails with a really rough heap abstraction that approximates all concrete heap locations with one abstract node. Sails detected all information leakages in all tests, but in three cases (Pred1, Pred6 and Pred7) it produced false alarms. This happens because Sails abstracts away the information produced when testing to true or false boolean conditions in if or while statements.
Since these benchmarks cover only problems with explicit flows, we performed further experiments using some Jif [36] case studies. The results are reported in Table 20 : we discovered all flows without producing any false alarm.
These results allow us to conclude that Sails is precise, since in 90% of the cases (28 out of 31 programs) it does not produce any false alarm.
About the performances, the analysis of all case studies takes 1.092 seconds (0.035 sec per method in average) without combining it with a numerical domain. When we combine it with Intervals it takes 3.015 seconds, whereas it takes 6.130 seconds in combination with Polka. All tests are performed using a MacBook Pro Intel Core 2 Duo 2.53 GHz with 4 GB of RAM memory. Therefore the experimental results underline the efficiency of Sails as well.
Related Work
In a security-typed language Volpano, Irvine and Smith [46] were the first ones to develop a type system to enforce information flow policies, where a type is inductively associated at compile-time with program statements in such a way that well-typed programs satisfy the non-interference property. The authors Test with a complex conditional Pred6
Test with addition Pred7
Test with multiple variables formulated the certification conditions of Denning's analysis [18] as a simple type system for a deterministic language: basically, a formal system of type inference rules for making judgments about programs. More generally, typebased approaches are designed such that well-typed programs do not leak secrets. A type is inductively associated at compile-time with program statements in such a way that any statement showing a potential low disclosing secrets is rejected. Type systems that enforce secure information flow have been designed for various languages and they have been used in different applications. Some of these approaches are, for example, applied to specific programs, e.g., written in VHDL [44] , where the analysis of information flow is closely related to the context. Moreover, the secure information flow problem was also handled in different situation, for example with multi-threaded programs [42] or with programs that employ explicit cryptographic operations [21, 3] .
A different approach is the use of standard control flow analysis to detect information leakage, e.g., [9, 29, 30] . The idea, of this technique, is to conservatively find the program paths through which data may flow. Generally, the data flow analysis approach to secure information flow as a translation from a given program that captures and facilitates reasoning about the possible flows. For example, Leino and Joshi [29] showed an application based on semantics, deriving a first-order predicate whose validity implies that an attacker cannot Simple implicit flow Implicit Simple implicit flow deduce any secure information from observing the public inputs, outputs and termination behavior of the program. The use of abstract interpretation in language-based security is not new, even though there aren't many works that use the lattice of abstract interpretations for evaluating the security of programs (for example [49] ). Probably, the main work about information flow analysis by abstract interpretation was done by Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [22] that generalizes the notion of non-interference making it parametric relatively to what an attacker can observe, and using it to model attackers as abstractions. A program semantics was characterized as an abstract interpretation of its maximal trace semantics in the corresponding transition system. The authors gave a method for checking abstract non-interference and they proved that checking abstract non-interference is a standard static program analysis problem. This method allows both to compare attackers and program secrecy by comparing the corresponding abstractions in the lattice of abstract interpretations, and to design automatic program certification tools for language-based security.
There are not so many implementations of secure information flow. In early 2000, some works began the control of sensitive information in realistic languages [7, 37] . Jif [4] and Flow CAML [40] are, as far as we know, the two main implementations about information flow analysis. Notice that, in the last years other language-based tools are developed for some specific language, e.g., Fabric [32] for distributed computing, the LIO library in haskell [43] and FlowFox( [16] ) a tool for JavaScript.
According to [41] , it seems be helpful to distinguish between two different application scenarios: developing secure software and stopping malicious software. The first scenario is based on to secure information flow analysis to help the development of software that satisfies some security properties. In this case, the analysis serves as a program development tool. The static analysis tool would alert the programmer to potential leaks and the developer could rewriting the code as necessary. An example of this scenario can be found in [4] , where Askarov and Sabelfeld discusses the implementation of a "mental poker" protocol in Jif. The second scenario, instead, the secure information flow analysis is used as a kind of filter to stop malicious software. In this case, we might imagine analyzing a piece of untrusted code before executing it, with the goal of guaranteeing its safety. This is much more challenging than first scenario: probably we would not have access to the source code and we would need to analyze the binary code. Analyzing binaries is more difficult than analyzing source code and has not received much attention in the literature (a Java bytecodes analysis is performed, for instance, by Barthe and Rezk in [8] ).
Given this overall context, the approach adopted in Sails is quite different from existing tools that deal with information flow analysis. Jif, for example, is a security-typed programming language that extends Java with support for information flow and access control, enforced at compile time and it is an ad hoc analysis that requires to annotate the code with some type information. If on the one hand Jif is more efficient than Sails, on the other hand Sails does not require any manual annotation, and it takes all advantages of compositional analyzers (e.g., we can combine Sails with a TVLA-based heap abstraction).
Our approach does not require to change the programming language, since it infers the flow of information directly on the original program, and it asks what are the private data that have not to be leaked to the user during the analysis execution.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented an information flow analysis through abstract interpretation based on a new domain that combines a variable dependency analysis and a numerical domain. We then introduced Sails that applies and implements this analysis on object-oriented programs. Sails is an extension of Sample, therefore it is modular with respect to the heap abstraction, and it can verify noninterference over recursive data structures using simple and efficient heap analyses. The experimental results underline the effectiveness of the analysis, since Sails is in position to analyze several benchmarks in few milliseconds per program without producing false alarms in more than 90% of the programs. Moreover, our tool does not require to modify the original language, since it works with mainstream languages like Java, and it does not require any manual annotation.
